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LEGAL STRATEGIES FOR
CHAILENGING THE CURRENT EU
ANTI-DUMPING CAMPAIGN AGAINST
IMPORTS FROM CHINA: A CHINESE
PERSPECTIVE
Hongliu Gong*
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past twenty years, trade relations between the
European Union ("EU") and China have been growing dramati-
cally. Consider the imports into the EU from China. The value
increased thirty-fold, from 2.107 billion euros in 1980, to 70.103
billion euros in 2000, covering a variety of products like ma-
chinery, chemical products textiles and clothing.! Today, China
is the EU's third most important trading partner (after the
United States and Japan), and the EU continuously main-
tained a trade deficit with China in the amount of roughly 32
billion euros during the first nine months of 2000.2
This may partly explain why there has been an accelerated
anti-dumping campaign in recent years within the EU against
Chinese products. Chinese industries, whose competitiveness
has increased in the European market, inevitably upset their
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1. Europa, Bilateral Trade Relations: China, Statistics, at
http'/europa.eu.intconmltrade/pdf/bilstatecono_china.xls (last visited Feb.
24, 2002) [hereinafter Europa I].
2. Id. See also Europa, Overview: Bilateral Trade and Investment Rela-
tions, at http'/europa.eu.intcomm/trade/bilateral/china/china.htm (last vis-
ited Feb. 24, 2002).
3. See Ke Ma, Women Wei Shenmo Zong Bei Fan Qingxiao? [Why Have
We Always Been Targeted by the Anti-Dumping Campaigns?], SoUTHERN
WEEKLY (Aug. 18, 2000) (on file with Journal).
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European counterparts. It has further triggered the EU's anti-
dumping process, where European companies continue to initi-
ate anti-dumping proceedings to defend their own regimes.
But a more important reason relates to China's "quasi-market
economy" status under EU anti-dumping law and practice.4 In
most cases, the European Commission ("Commission") and the
Council of the European Union ("Council") have regarded
China as a non-market economy ("NME") country, and applied
arguably discriminatory methodology and unfair policy in de-
termining the margin of dumping and injury to alleged Chinese
exporters/producers. Thus, an artificially high dumping/injury
margin would easily be established.5
As a result, China has become one of the most significant
targets in the EU anti-dumping practice. Since 1988, anti-
dumping proceedings against China have substantially in-
creased.6 Even worse from this perspective, most of the pro-
ceedings against Chinese enterprises resulted in high anti-
dumping duties or minimum undertakings.7
By the end of 1999, the Commission and Council had 151
anti-dumping measures and five anti-subsidy measures in
force, covering sixty-three products and thirty-five countries.
Of these 156 measures, thirty-three concerned China, eleven
concerned Russia and eleven measures applied to other NME
countries. In other words, the EU anti-dumping measures
against China accounted for 21% of the whole, and 35% of those
concerned NME countries.8 These measures severely under-
mined the competitive capability of many Chinese industries
involved, and virtually excluded them from the European mar-
4. Id.
5. See Donghui Fu, EC Anti-Dumping Law and Individual Treatment
Policy in Cases Involving Imports from China, 31 J. WORLD TRADE 73, 78-79
(1997).
6. Id.
7. Overview of the Monitoring of Third Country Safeguard Cases and of
the Implementation of the Trade Barriers Regulation: Eighteenth Annual
Report from the Commission to the European Parliament on the Commu-
nity's Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidy Activities, COM(00)440 final at 19-20,
available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/tradepdf/adrep.2000_en.pdf (last
visited Feb. 12, 2002) [hereinafter Eighteenth Annual Report].
8. Id.
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ket. In this sense, China has also become the most distinctive
victim of the EU anti-dumping practice. 9
In this Article, from a Chinese perspective, the author will
suggest legitimate and effective strategies for challenging the
current EU anti-dumping campaign against imports from
China. Part H will illustrate the EU anti-dumping law appli-
cable to imports from China. Part III will discuss the EU anti-
dumping practice in relation to China. Part IV will describe
the impact of the campaign on Chinese industries and empha-
size the necessity for a Chinese challenge. Part V will propose a
series of legal strategies for China to achieve the goal of true
fair trade. Part VI will draw a conclusion.
II. EU ANTI-DUMPING LAW APPLICABLE TO IMPORTS FROM
CHINA
Dumping is a major aspect of the unfair trading practice in
the EU's external trading relations." Determination of dump-
ing depends on three elements: (1) normal value; (2) export
price; and (3) dumping margin (a result of the comparison of
the former two)." According to the EU anti-dumping legisla-
tion, "A product is to be considered as being dumped if its ex-
port price to the Community is less than a comparable price for
the like product, in the ordinary course of trade, as established
for the exporting country." 12 Here, the comparable price means
the normal value at which exporters sell goods on their domes-
tic market.3 In the EU anti-dumping practice, the targeted
exporting countries are categorized as either a market economy
("ME") or an NME. The functioning of the EU anti-dumping
instrument is based on these two respective categories.
14
9. See Ma, supra note 3.
10. TRADE IN ACTION, TRADE POLICY INSTRUMENT: ON GUARD FOR UNFAIR
PRACTICE (2001), available at http://europa.eu.inttcomm/trade/policy/
indexen.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2002).
11. Council Regulation 384/96 on Protection Against Dumped Imports
from Countries Not Members of the European Community, art. 2, 1996 O.J.
(L 56) 1,4.
12. Id. art. 1(2).
13. See id. art. 2(1).
14. Jianyu Wang, A Critique of the Application to China of the Non-Market
Economy Rules of Antidumping Legislation and Practice of the European
Union, 33 J. WORLD TRADE 117, 119-20 (1999).
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The main practical difference between the treatment of an
ME and an NME is related to the methodologies adopted to
determine the existence of dumping for the purpose of anti-
dumping investigation."5 For the exporters from an ME coun-
try, normal value is based on their own domestic price. For
those who come from NME countries, the calculation relies on
an analogue country methodology, which means normal value
is based on the domestic price of an analogue country selected,
other than that of the exporter's own country. 6 Adoption of the
analogue country methodology seems merely a technical mat-
ter, but in fact is vital. It makes the dumping margin artifi-
cially high, and subsequently leads to a large amount of the
anti-dumping duty imposed on exporters.'
7
Unless it is evident that a dumped product has caused the
"material injury" to certain industries of the EU, no anti-
dumping measure will be taken against this product. 8 So, the
evaluation of injury is a primary step for an anti-dumping pro-
ceeding. Another primary step is the consideration of commu-
nity interests.' 9
In general, the legal sources of the EU anti-dumping instru-
ment are at three levels. The primary source is the "common
commercial policy" ("CCP") laid down in Article 133 (ex Art.
113) of the Treaty Establishing the European Community." It
provides that the CCP "shall be based on uniform principles,
particularly in regard to ... export policy and measures to pro-
tect trade such as those to be taken in the event of dumping or
subsidies."'
Subject to the CCP, the Council has developed a comprehen-
sive body of regulations to govern dumped imports from outside
countries.22 These are secondary sources of EU anti-dumping
15. Id. at 120.
16. See Council Regulation 384/96, supra note 11, art. 2(1).
17. Fu, supra note 5, at 81.
18. Council Regulation 384/96, supra note 11, art. 3.
19. See id. art. 21.
20. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Nov. 10, 1997, art.
113, O.J. (C 340) 3, 237 (1997), available at http://europa.eu.intleur-
lex/en/treaties/dat/ec-cons-treaty en.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2002).
21. Id.
22. See Eighteenth Annual Report, supra note 7, at 12. See generally
Council Regulation 384/96, supra note 11; Council Regulation 2026/97, 1997
O.J. (L 288) 1.
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law. Due to their operative and administrative nature, Council
Regulations are the major source of law governing most aspects
of the EU anti-dumping practice, providing general principles
and implementing rules.'
Case law is the third major source of EU anti-dumping law.'
With a competence to review anti-dumping cases, the European
Court of Justice ("ECJ") and the European Court of the First
Instance ("CFI") hear a large number of such cases to ensure
correct implementation of EU rules. The judgments of these
courts constitute another concrete legal basis for the EU anti-
dumping instrument.2
A. Brief Legislative History
The first anti-dumping law of the European Community
("EC") on "protection against dumping or the granting of boun-
ties or subsidies by countries which are not members" was
passed on April 5, 1968. Since then, legislation in this field
has developed over the last thirty years, reflecting the result of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") negotia-
tions, judgments of the ECJ, new accessions to the EU or sim-
ple procedural or substantive refinements.27 Of course, the
changing economic situation of the EU's external trading part-
ners, particularly NME countries, has also been taken into ac-
count.
The first law codifying the EC anti-dumping practice towards
NME countries was Council Regulation 1681179, introduced in
1979.2 It contained a hierarchy of discriminatory special rules
for calculating the normal value of products originating in
NME countries. Three years later, the EC promulgated
23. See infra Part II.A. for an elaboration.
24. See Eighteenth Annual Report, supra note 7, at 16, 90-93.
25. Id.
26. Council Regulation 459/68 on Protection Against Dumping or the
Granting of Bounties or Subsidies by Countries Which are Not Members of
the European Economic Community, art. 1, 1968 O.J. (L 93) 1, 2.
27. See Wang, supra note 14, at 119.
28. Council Regulation 1681/79 Amending Council Regulation 459/68 on'
Protection Against Dumping or the Granting of Bounties or Subsidies by
Countries Which are Not Members of the European Economic Community,
1979 O.J. (L 196) 1.
29. See id.
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Council Regulations 1765/820 and 1766/82, 3' indirectly enu-
merating a number of NME countries to which the special anti-
dumping rules should apply. China was counted as one of
those countries.32 In 1994, the two Regulations were repealed
and replaced by Council Regulation 519/94, of which Annex 1
listed a group of countries considered as "state-trading coun-
tries" for anti-dumping calculation purposes." China subse-
quently was covered in that list.
4
The special anti-dumping rules applicable to NME countries
continuously developed and were recently laid down in Article
2(7) of Council Regulation 384/96 ("Basic Anti-dumping Regu-
lation" or "Basic Regulation") as the analogue country method-
ology.31 Since its passage in 1995, the Basic Regulation has
been the primary anti-dumping legislation of the EU.36 Article
9(5) further codified a one country, one duty rule, and applied it
to NME countries.
In April 1998, the EU issued a new regulation, Council Regu-
lation 905/98 ("New Anti-dumping Rule"), to amend Article 2(7)
of the Basic Regulation." The amendment eliminated China
from the list of NME countries, and replaced the analogue
country methodology with a case-by-case approach. In the
case of China, it means that the domestic prices and costs of
the targeted Chinese products may be used to calculate normal
value in the anti-dumping proceedings against imports if the
country met certain criteria." Regulation 905/98 represented
significant progress in EU legislation, as it reflected efforts and
30. Council Regulation 1765/82 on Common Rules for Imports from State-
Trading Countries, 1982 O.J. (L 195) 1.
31. Council Regulation 1766/82 on Common Rules for Imports from the
People's Republic of China, 1982 O.J. (L 195) 21.
32. See Wang, supra note 14, at 119.
33. Council Regulation 519/94 on Common Rules for Imports from Certain
Third Countries and Repealing Regulation 1765/82, 1766/82 and 3420/83,
Annex 1, 1994 O.J. (L 67) 89, 97.
34. See Wang, supra note 14, at 119.
35. Council Regulation 384/96, supra note 11, art. 2(7).
36. See Wang, supra note 14, at 119.
37. See Council Regulation 384/96, supra note 11, art. 9(5).
38. Council Regulation 905/98 Amending Council Regulation 384/96 on
Protection against Dumped Imports from Countries Not Members of the
European Community, art. 1, 1998 O.J. (L 128) 18, 19.
39. Id. art. 1.
40. See id.
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intent to make the anti-dumping instrument adherent to the
changing economic reality of the EU's NME trading partners so
as to act "appropriate[ly]." 41
B. Current Applicable Law
Today, having experienced many amendments and changes
in practice, the EU anti-dumping law applicable to imports
from China as well as other NME countries is moving along
toward greater maturity. The analogue country methodology
and the one country, one duty rule, which have long been the
cornerstone of the EU anti-dumping instrument against NME
trading partners, and have long been severely criticized by
Chinese scholars and practitioners as "discriminatory" and "un-
fair," are phasing out as the EU introduces a new case-by-case
approach into the anti-dumping practice against China and
Russia.43
Such progress has been fixed by two Council Regulations
currently in force: The Basic Anti-dumping Regulation and the
New Anti-dumping Rule. As the primary anti-dumping law, the
Basic Regulation provides general principles, overall proce-
dures and guidelines for most of the substantive issues within
the EU.44 The general principles cover: (1) definitions of dump-
ing and dumping-related factors (such as normal value, and
like products); (2) determinations of dumping, injury and EU
industry; (3) consultation; (4) verification visits; (5) non-
cooperation; (6) confidentiality; and (7) disclosure.45 Despite
frequent and sometimes significant alterations in anti-dumping
legislation, these general principles have continued unchanged.
The Basic Regulation also establishes a set of procedures for
the operation of each anti-dumping proceeding, regardless of
which country the targeted imports come from, whether MEs
or NMEs. The overall procedures are illustrated as: (1) initia-
tion of proceedings; (2) investigation; (3) provisional measures;
41. Id. at 18.
42. Fu, supra note 5, at 79.
43. See Council Regulation 905/98, supra note 38, art. 1.
44. See Council Regulation 384/96, supra note 11.
45. See id. art. 1.
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(4) undertakings; (5) termination without measures/imposition
of definitive duties; and (6) duration, reviews and refunds. 6
Article 2(7) of the Basic Regulation sets forth the analogue
country methodology applied to imports from enumerated NME
countries (including China) for calculation of normal value. It
provides:
In the case of imports from non-market economy countries...
normal value shall be determined on the basis of the price or
constructed value in a market economy third country, or
where those are not possible, on any other reasonable basis,
including the price actually paid or payable in the Community
for the like product, duly adjusted if necessary to include a
reasonable profit margin. An appropriate market economy
third country shall be selected in a not unreasonable manner
47
Article 9(5) of the Basic Regulation sets forth the one coun-
try, one duty rule applied to imports from enumerated NME
countries in imposition of anti-dumping duty. It provides:
An anti-dumping duty shall be imposed in the appropriate
amounts in each case, on a non-discriminatory basis .... The
Regulation imposing the duty shall specify the duty for each
supplier or, if that is impracticable, and as a general rule in
the cases referred to in Article 2(7), the supplying country
concerned. 48
Accordingly, under the one country, one duty rule, the EU
treats all suppliers of a certain industry from China as a uni-
fied body, therefore denying the individual export prices
charged by each supplier, and imposing a single anti-dumping
duty on all the suppliers concerned. 49 As the result of this rule,
even an innocent Chinese exporter who does not commit dump-
ing is subject to a duty, if other Chinese exporters in its indus-
try do so. Further, the cooperating exporters have to pay a
higher anti-dumping duty than their dumping margin, since a
single duty rate is calculated on the basis of the average export
prices of all the cooperating and non-cooperating exporters. °
46. See id. arts. 5-9, 11.
47. See id. art. 2(7).
48. See id. art. 9(5).
49. Fu, supra note 5, at 80.
50. Id.
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In addition, the export price of non-cooperating exporters is
always determined on the basis of the facts then available,
which can lead to a very high dumping margin."
It is notable that the application of the one country, one duty
rule in the EU anti-dumping practice against China is not ex-
clusive, as some exceptions followed on occasion.12 Those excep-
tions are subject to an "individual treatment" policy, under
which the individual export prices charged by each accused
Chinese exporter/producer would be counted to calculate an
individual dumping margin, and any anti-dumping duty that
may be imposed would be a specific one based on the particular
situation.53
However, the implementation of the individual treatment
policy by the EU is neither consistent nor predictable. In the
1990 "Tungsten Ores and Concentrate" case, the Commission
determined separate dumping margins of 47.4% and 53.2% for
two Chinese state trading companies, the China, National Non-
Ferrous Metals Import & Export Corporation and the China
National Metals and Minerals Import & Export Corporation. 4
Subsequently, separate provisional duties were set for, and un-
dertakings were offered to the two companies. But the EU did
not explicitly pronounce any rules in this case to explain on
what grounds it granted individual treatment. 5
It was in the 1991 matter of "small-screen colour televi-
sion[s("SCTVs") that the Commission and Council set up the
relevant rules to examine whether individual treatment should
51. Id.
52. See id. at 81, 84.
53. Id. at 81.
54. Commission Regulation 761/90 Imposing a Provisional Anti-Dumping
Duty on Imports of Tungsten Ores and Concentrates Originating in the Peo-
ple's Republic of China, and Terminating the Proceeding Concerning Imports
Originating in Hong Kong, 1990 O.J. (L 83) 23, 24-25. See also Council Regu-
lation 2735/90 Imposing a Definitive Anti-Dumping Duty on Imports of
Tungsten Ores and Concentrates Originating in the People's Republic of
China and Definitive Collecting the Provisional Anti-Dumping Duty, 1990
O.J. (L 264) 1; Commission Decision 478/90 Accepting Undertakings Offered
by Certain Exporters in Connection with the Anti-Dumping Proceeding Con-
cerning Imports of Tungsten Ores and Concentrates Originating in the Peo-
ple's Republic of China and Terminating the Investigation with Regard to
these Exporters, 1990 O.J. (L 264) 55.
55. See Fu, supra note 5, at 84.
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be granted to Chinese exporters.56 In this case, individual
treatment was granted to Chinese joint-ventures with foreign
investment, but not to state-owned companies. 7 Rules in the
SCTVs matter were confirmed in other cases, for example
"video tapes" in 1991,58 and "certain polyester yarns" in 1992.59
However, in the 1993 "bicycles" matter, the EU changed the
policy, and individual treatment for Chinese companies was
systematically refused. 60
In April 1998, the New Anti-dumping Rule replaced Article
2(7) of the Basic Regulation and introduced a new case-by-case
approach to the EU anti-dumping practice against China and
Russia.61 The New Anti-dumping Rule is composed of three
subparagraphs. Subparagraph (a) maintains the provision of
56. See Commission Regulation 129/91 Imposing a Provisional Anti-
Dumping Duty on Imports of Small-Screen Colour Television Receivers
Originating in Hong Kong and the People's Republic of China, 1991 O.J. (L
14) 31; Council Regulation 2093/91 on Imposing a Definitive Anti-Dumping
Duty on Imports of Small-Screen Colour Television Receivers Originating in
Hong Kong and the People's Republic of China and Collecting Definitively the
Provisional Duty, 1991 O.J. (L 195) 1.
57. See Council Regulation 2093/91, supra note 56, at 5.
58. Commission Regulation 1034/91 Imposing a Provisional Anti-Dumping
Duty on Imports of Video Tapes in Cassettes Originating in the People's Re-
public of China, 1991 O.J. (L 106) 15; Council Regulation 3091/91 Imposing a
Definitive Anti-Dumping Duty on Imports of Video Tapes in Cassettes Origi-
nating in the People's Republic of China and Definitively Collecting the Pro-
visional Duty, 1991 O.J. (L 293) 2.
59. Commission Regulation 2904/91 Imposing a Provisional Anti-Dumping
Duty on Imports of Certain Polyester Yarns (Man-Made Staple Fibres) Origi-
nating in Taiwan, Indonesia, India, the People's Republic of China and Tur-
key and Terminating the Anti-Dumping Proceeding in Respect of Imports of
These Yams Originating in the Republic of Korea, 1991 O.J. (L 276) 7; Coun-
cil Regulation 830/92 Imposing a Definitive Anti-Dumping Duty on Imports
of Certain Polyester Yarns (Man-Made Staple Fibres) Originating in Taiwan,
Indonesia, India, the People's Republic of China and Turkey and Collecting
Definitively the Provisional Duty, 1992 O.J. (L 88) 1.
60. Commission Regulation 550/93 Imposing a Provisional Anti-Dumping
Duty on Imports of Bicycles Originating in the People's Republic of China,
1993 O.J. (L 58) 12, 18-19; Council Regulation 2474/93 on Imposing a Defini-
tive Anti-Dumping Duty on Imports Into the Community of Bicycles Origi-
nating in the People's Republic of China and Collecting Definitively the Pro-
visional Anti-Dumping Duty, 1993 O.J. (L 228) 1, 3-4.
61. Council Regulation 905/98, supra note 38, art. 1.
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the original Article 2(7) of the Basic Regulation.62 Subpara-
graph (b) inserts the new case-by-case approach. .It provides:
In anti-dumping investigations concerning imports from ...
the People's Republic of China, normal value will be deter-
mined in accordance with paragraph 1 to 6, if it is shown, on
the basis of properly substantiated claims by one or more pro-
ducers subjective to the investigation and in accordance with
the criteria and procedures set out in subparagraph (c) that
market economy conditions prevail for thig producer or pro-
ducers in respect of the manufacture and sale of the like
product concerned. When this is not the case, the rules set
out under subparagraph (a) shall apply. 63
Accordingly, China is not automatically designated as an ME
country, so the targeted Chinese industries will not be entitled
to full ME status in the determination of normal value and ex-
port price, unless they can prove the existence of prevailing ME
conditions listed in subparagraph (c).
Subparagraph (c) illustrates five cumulative criteria for
granting ME status to the Chinese or Russian companies under
investigation for dumping, and puts the burden of proof on
these companies. These accused companies need to prove they
meet the following:
(1) Decisions of firms are taken without significant State
interference and are made in response to market signals;
(2) Accounts must be independently audited in line with in-
ternational accounting standards;
(3) Production costs and the financial situation of the com-
pany are not affected by distortions carried over from the
former State-led economic system, barter trade or compensa-
tion of debts;
(4) Companies are subject to bankruptcy and property law;
and
(5) Exchange rate conversations are carried out at market
rates. 6
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Commission Proposal for a Council Regulation Amending Regulation
384/96 on Protection Against Dumped Imports from Countries Not Members
of the European Community, COM(00)363 final at 6, available at
http'J/europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/com/pdf/2000/com2000_0363en01.pdf (last
visited Feb. 24, 2002) [hereinafter Commission Proposal].
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With the New Anti-dumping Rule in force, Article 9(5) of the
Basic Regulation is consequently altered. A more flexible case-
by-case approach has replaced the one country, one duty rule.
The accused Chinese exporters/producers will be assessed an
individual anti-dumping duty other than a country-wide duty
as long as they meet the criteria provided in the New Anti-
dumping Rule.
III. EU ANTI-DUMPING PRACTICE IN RELATION TO CHINA
A. Historical Overview
Europe has been an export market for Chinese goods for
many years.65 In the early years, the anti-dumping duty was
employed to block Chinese light industrial products, including
shoes, suitcases and bags from entering the European market.
Later, the target shifted to mechanical and electronic prod-
ucts.66
The first EU anti-dumping matter against China was its in-
vestigation of "saccharin," initiated in 1979.67 But the brunt of
the campaign against China began in 1988 when China carried
out its open policy and commenced national economic reform,
which succeeded in bringing about an increase in China-EU
trade interactions. 6 Between 1990 and 1994, the EU initiated
166 anti-dumping investigations against imports from thirty-
two non-Member States, among which twenty-five were against
China, with thirty-one products (involving the chemical, elec-
tronic, and iron and steel sectors, and other light industries)
subject to EU measures. 69 Later, during the five-year period
from 1995 to 1999, 218 investigations were initiated on imports
from thirty-nine non-Member States." China was one of two
65. See Europa I, supra note 1.
66. Boob Tube Ballyhoo: China TV Makers Unite to Challenge EU Anti-
Dumping Charges, CHINA ONLINE (July 6, 2000), at
http://www.chinaonline.com [hereinafter Boob Tube].
67. Notice of Initiation of Anti-Dumping/Anti-Subsidy Procedure Concern-
ing Saccharin and its Salts Originating in China, Japan and the USA, 1979
O.J. (C 207) 4.
68. See Fu, supra note 5, at 73-74.
69. Id. at 74-75.
70. Eighteenth Annual Report, supra note 7, at 20.
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main countries concerned, with twenty-nine investigations
against her.7 The other was India, with twenty-five cases.72
A rapid growth of the EU anti-dumping campaign against
China is reflected in the SCTVs matter.73 Chinese color televi-
sions first entered the European market in the 1980's. Cur-
rently, annual exports of Xiamen Overseas Chinese Electronic
Co. Ltd. ("XOCECO") sets alone are between 400,000 and
500,000 units.74 In 1988, the EU began to investigate anti-
dumping charges brought against color televisions made in
China and South Korea. The result of that investigation came
out against the manufacturers, and an anti-dumping duty of
15.3% was levied on Chinese televisions beginning in 1991.
71
In 1992, the EU launched another investigation of imported
televisions, which resulted in an anti-dumping tariff of 25.6%
being imposed by the Council on Chinese sets beginning in
March 1995.76 Three years later, following the promulgation of
the New Anti-dumping Rule, the EU decided that the existing
tariff rate on imported sets would remain unchanged for most
nations, but rise to 44.6% for those made in China.77 Thus, for
all intents and purposes, Chinese color televisions were ex-
pelled from the European market.78
B. The Current Problematic Situation
In July 1998, the New Anti-dumping Rule entered into force,
making significant legislative progress in the EU anti-dumping
71. Id. at 127.
72. Id.
73. See Commission Regulation 129/91, supra note 59; Council Regulation
2093/91, supra note 59.
74. See Boob Tube, supra note 66.
75. Council Regulation 2094/91, supra note 59, art. 2.
76. Council Regulation 710/95 Imposing a Definitive Anti-Dumping Duty
on Imports of Colour Television Receivers Originating in Malaysia, the Peo-
ple's Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Thailand and
Collecting Definitively the Provisional Duty Imposed, art. 1(2), 1995 O.J. (L
73)3, 11.
77. Council Regulation 2584/98 Amending Regulation 710/95 Imposing a
Definitive Anti-Dumping Duty on Imports of Colour Television Receivers
Originating in Malaysia, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Ko-
rea, Singapore and Thailand and Collecting Definitively the Provisional Duty
Imposed, art. 1, 1998 O.J. (L 324) 1, 12.
78. See Boob Tube, supra note 66.
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regime." However, this has not been followed by the signifi-
cant progress that many observers may have expected. The
EU campaign against China has not been restrained, nor have
the accused Chinese exporters/producers been afforded more
beneficial treatment (ME status) in anti-dumping proceedings
due to the 1998 amendments.
In 1999, the new anti-dumping initiations within the EU
reached eighty-six, involving imports from twenty-nine non-
Member States and covering thirty-two products.80  Histori-
cally, this is the largest number of new initiations in compari-
son with any prior year, such as twenty-nine in 1998 or forty-
five in 1997.8' Among those eighty-six anti-dumping initia-
tions, twelve involved Chinese products, accounting for 13.95%
of all new investigations in that year.
2
One important reason for such an increase of anti-dumping
actions is related to the Asian financial crisis. "3 The crisis led
to a decline in domestic consumption in South East Asia, and
affected trade with countries traditionally exporting to this re-
gion. In turn, countries such as China were compelled to redi-
rect exports into other available markets, mainly towards the
U.S. and the EU. 4 In this context, reference is made to the in-
crease in new investigations opened by the EU concerning
China and Taiwan.
However, the Asian financial crisis is essentially an occa-
sional circumstance that may not explain the whole story of the
ongoing severe EU anti-dumping practices against China, and
a continuous trend of such practices appears inevitable for the
near future. Meanwhile, the introduction of the New Anti-
dumping Rule to this field has not yet brought about a situa-
tion that would inspire optimism about prospects for less dis-
crimination and greater fairness in EU policy and practice to-
ward Chinese business.
From July 1998 to June 2000, there have been nine anti-
dumping investigations concerning the implementation of the
New Anti-dumping Rule with China, where twenty-seven ac-
79. Council Regulation 905/98, supra note 38, art. 2.
80. Eighteenth Annual Report, supra note 7, at 122.
81. Id. at 20.
82. Id. at 124-26.
83. See id. at 21.
84. Id.
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cused Chinese companies claimed ME treatment. In the end,
only three of them were granted ME status, representing just
over 10% of all companies making the ME petitions."5
The low success level of ME claims is not in line with the
original expectations from both the EU and China. A main
reason for such a significant failure is related to the ability of
the claiming Chinese companies to meet the five criteria set
forth in the New Anti-dumping Rule. 6 For the twenty-four
companies who were refused ME treatment, the EU decided
that they had failed to meet the'five criteria due to the follow-
ing facts: (1) "restrictions on selling on the domestic market;"
(2) "significant state interference in decision-making;" (3) "ab-
sence of properly audited accounts;" (4) "significant distortions
in costs as a result of previous state involvement in the com-
pany;" and (5) that "barter trade commonly exists." 7
At this point, we can see that the Chinese steel industry has
been a typical case. In May 1999, the Commission initiated an
investigation within the EU regarding "hot rolled ... non-alloy"
steel imported into the European market by China, Romania
and India, resulting in an imposition of anti-dumping duties."
The case was remarkable at the time, for it was the first large-
scale test case of the New Anti-dumping Rule which recognized
China's gradual transition to a market economy. To challenge
the EU's orthodox dumping formulae, Brussels-based lawyers
representing Chinese exporters invoked the right granted to
Beijing and Moscow two years earlier by submitting price data
from the Chinese domestic market rather than from a compa-
rable reference country which exports the same product as was
always the case before the New Anti-dumping Rule was intro-
duced.89
Though the Commission's anti-dumping officials declared
that they would never "take a soft or a tough line with the Chi-
85. See Commission Proposal, supra note 64, at 6.
86. See id. at 6-7.
87. Id.
88. Commission Decision 307/2000 Imposing a Provisional Anti-Dumping
Duty on Imports of Certain Hot-Rolled Flat Products of Non-Alloy Steel
Originating in the People's Republic of China, India and Romania, art. 1,
2000 O.J. (L 36) 4, 18. See also Peter Chapman, Chinese Steel Probe Will be
Key Test of New Anti-Dumping Rules, EUR. VOICE, May 1999, at 20, 26.
89. See Chapman, supra note 88, at 26.
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nese" since they were "technocrats," and would "take every-
thing on a case-by-case basis,"" the result was rather frustra-
tion. All six Chinese companies claiming ME treatment in this
case were refused, as the Commission decided that none of
those companies met the criteria on an individual basis, al-
though as a group the six together demonstrated that all the
criteria were in fact met. 91 The Commission listed the reasons
for its refusal as: (1) all companies were fully or partially
owned by the state; (2) agreements existed to purchase raw
materials from state owned suppliers; and (3) only nominal fees
were paid for land-use rights under barter trade practices.92
In May 2000, the Commission initiated another investigation
against Chinese "fluorescent" lighting products, involving sev-
eral hundred Chinese manufacturers.93 Of the Chinese manu-
factures investigated through random sampling, only two were
finally entitled to ME status and able to take advantage of
their preferential tariff treatment.94 Seven other Chinese com-
panies were not so fortunate in receiving NME status, meaning
their products would be subject to the high average tariffs.95
C. Future Trends
From all that has been reviewed above, with rapid growth of
China-EU trade relations, a continuous trend of the EU anti-
dumping campaign against Chinese products is foreseeable in
the next five to ten years (or even longer)." The improvement
of the EU instrument, to adhere to the changing reality of
China's economy, 7 may provide the accused Chinese industries
more or less legal opportunity to defend against, and challenge
90. Id.
91. Commission Decision 307/2000, supra note 88, at 8. See also Commis-
sion Proposal, supra note 64, at 7.
92. See Commission Proposal, supra note 64, at 7-8.
93. Commission Regulation 255/2001 Imposing a Provisional Anti-
Dumping Duty on Imports of Integrated Electronic Compact Fluorescent
Lamps Originating in the People's Republic of China, 2001 O.J. (L 38) 8. See
also EU Targets Chinese Light-Fixture Producers in Anti-Dumping Probe,
CHINA ONLINE (Aug. 16, 2000), at http://www.chinaonline.com [hereinafter
EU Targets].
94. Commission Regulation 255/2001, supra note 93, at 10.
95. Id. at 10-12.
96. See Boob Tube, supra note 66.
97. See Council Regulation 905/98, supra note 38, at 18.
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this ongoing campaign, but not stop it. In addition, the entry of
China into the" World Trade Organization ("WTO")98 may help
her gain international judicial remedies to the EU anti-
dumping campaign under the international trade regime.99 Re-
alistically, however, China will never be able to wipe out the
campaign.
IV. IMPACT OF THE EU ANTI-DUMPING CAMPAIGN ON CHINESE
INDUSTRIES
The ongoing EU campaign against imports from China has
invited growing concern from both Chinese export industries
and the government in Beijing."' Since the full campaign be-
gan in 1988, it has created substantial, serious impacts on
many aspects of the China's economy."'
A. A Most Visible and Direct Impact: Monetary Losses of
Chinese Industries
Usually, the value of an anti-dumping case is so high that
each percentage point of an anti-dumping margin can repre-
sent a significant annual cost to the company.10 2 In the case of
Chinese industries involved, from 1990 to 1997, the import
value of Chinese products subject to EU investigations
amounted to roughly 100-200 million euros per year, corre-
sponding to 1% of the total value of annual imports from
98. On November 10, 2001, the WTO's Ministerial Conference approved
China's entry into the WTO. See Press Release, World Trade Organization,
WTO Ministerial Conference Approves China's Accession (Nov. 10, 2001),
available at http'//www.wto.org/english/news.elpres0le/pr252_e.htm [here-
inafter Press Release].
99. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settle-
ment of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex 2, LEGAL INsTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994), available at
http'/www.wto.org/english/tratop-edispue/dsu-e.htm (last visited Feb. 24,
2002) [hereinafter DSUI.
100. Yiwei Wang, Philips De Yuandong Yinmo [Philips' Far-Eastern Con-
spiracy], GUANGZHOU DAILY ONLINE (Sept. 22, 2000), at
http'//dailynews.sina.com.
101. Id.
102. See Christopher F. Corr, Trade Protection in the New Millennium: The
Ascendancy of Antidumping Measures, 18 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 49, 103
(1997).
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China.0 3 In 1994, the import value of Chinese products subject
to EU investigations or measures corresponded to roughly 1
billion euros, or more than 4% of the total import value (23 bil-
lion euros) of Chinese products that year.4
B. Another Visible and Direct Impact: Inferior Position of
Chinese Exporters/Producers Within the European Market
An anti-dumping case may result in imposition of prohibitive
company-specific import duties, thus placing the exporting
company concerned at a competitive disadvantage (relative to
domestic companies, as well as exporters from non-targeted
countries). If the dumping duties are high enough, exporters
can be excluded from the market entirely.
0 5
Suffering the EU anti-dumping campaign for more than ten
years, quite a few Chinese industries, especially those who
have strong competitive capability in the world market, have
been severely damaged in their business, either losing signifi-
cant market share or being expelled from the European mar-
ket."6 Among these victims, the Chinese television industry is
a significant example.
0 7
Before 1993, the export of a single Chinese television manu-
facturer, XOCECO, to the EU had reached 300,000 sets a
year.0 8 Until 1999, after experiencing a twelve-year EU anti-
dumping campaign, the total export of the Chinese television
industry to the EU market was just 30,000 sets. 9 By now, the
Chinese television industry has almost been excluded from the
European market."0 An even earlier example is the Chinese
bicycle industry. In 1991, China's export level reached
2,000,000 bicycles."' After being hit with an anti-dumping
103. Fu, supra note 5, at 76.
104. See id. at 76-77.
105. See Corr, supra note 102, at 74.
106. See Yiwei Wang, supra note 100.
107. See Ma, supra note 3.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Xuezhong Wan, Zhongguo Chengwei Guoji Fan Qingxiao Zui Da
Shouhaizhe [China has Become the Most Distinctive Victim in the Interna-
tional Anti-Dumping Practice], CHINA LEGAL DAILY (Aug. 8, 2000), at
http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/gb/contents/2000-08/08/content_2886.htm.
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duty of 30.6% in 1993, this industry was effectively expelled
from the European market."' China's fluorescent lights indus-
try presents a more recent case. Shenzhen Zhongdian Lighting
Co. ("Shenzhen Zhongdian"), China's leading enterprise in this
industry, exported lighting products worth almost USD $40
million in 1999, with half of these products being exported to
EU Member States." However, since May 17, 2000, when the
EU initiated its investigation against this industry, Shenzhen
Zhongdian's export orders have fallen daily, with the com-
pany's current daily export volume plummeting more than
60%."4
What is more painful to the Chinese is that in numerous
cases where their products were excluded from the European
market as a result of the imposition of anti-dumping measures,
the market shares previously held by Chinese exporters were
simply replaced by the exports from other developing coun-
tries."
5
C. The Longstanding, Profound Impact on Chinese Emerging
Industries
In the EU anti-dumping practice, many targeted Chinese in-
dustries are emerging industries such as electronics and steel
production, both vital to China's economic development."6 Due
to current EU law and practice, the conclusion of a single anti-
dumping case against one or more individual Chinese compa-
nies may become a quasi-precedent for later cases against oth-
ers in the same industry. Therefore, with respect to the Euro-
pean market, one conclusion in favor of the European com-
plainant may threaten the exportation of the whole Chinese
industry concerned. Also, the more such conclusions come out,
the more European companies will be encouraged to abuse
their anti-dumping rights against their Chinese counterparts. 7
This creates an even more unfair and discriminatory circum-
112. See Council Regulation 2474/93, supra note 60, art. 1.
113. See EU Targets, supra note 93.
114. See Commission Regulation 255/2001, supra note 93; EU Targets, su-
pra note 93.
115. See Fu, supra note 5, at 104-105.
116. See Boob Tube, supra note 66.
117. See Fu, supra note 5, at 104.
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stance in regard to Chinese products exported into the Euro-
pean market. As a result, not only will the emerging Chinese
industries be damaged, but long-term China-EU trade rela-
tions will be undermined.
D. The Long-Term, Negative Impact on China's Foreign Direct
Investment
Since the 1980's, when China enacted its open policy and
commenced economic reform, it has established an export-
oriented economy and attracted tremendous foreign direct in-
vestment ("FDI"). Most of the Chinese exporters are foreign-
investment enterprises. 18 As the EU anti-dumping campaign
becomes more and more severe concerning imports from China,
there is a sharp decrease of exports and profits by these enter-
prises, which may discourage the foreign investors from con-
tinuing to invest in Chinese industries affected by the EU cam-
paign. 19
No doubt, the ongoing EU campaign has led to serious nega-
tive effects at all levels of China's economy. As this campaign
evidences a continuous trend, it is increasingly urgent and nec-
essary for the Chinese industries concerned and China itself to
develop a set of adequate and effective legal strategies of de-
fense and challenge. 2 '
V. LEGAL STRATEGIES FOR CHINA TO CHALLENGE THE EU ANTI-
DUMPING CAMPAIGN
As previously mentioned, the ongoing EU anti-dumping
campaign against imports from China has not only resulted in
serious negative impacts on the Chinese industries concerned,
but has also become a large obstacle to the development of
China-EU trade relations. To deal with that difficult situation,
118. SHAuN BRESLIN, "MADE IN CHINA": THE GROWTH OF CHINESE TRADE 9-
10 (Cent. for the Study of Globalization and Regionalisation, Working Paper
No. 19/98, 1998), available at http://www.warwick.ac.uk/facsoc/GSGR
/wpapers/wp1998.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2002).
119. See Wan, supra note 111.
120. See Yingjie Guojihua Tiaozhan - Yingdui Oumeng Fan Qingxiao Yan-
taohui Lianhe Shengming [Joint-Declaration Upon the Seminar on Meeting
International Challenges in Dealing with the EU Anti-Dumping Campaign],
GUANGZHOU DAILY ONLINE (Sept. 22, 2000), at http://dailynews.sina.com
[hereinafter Joint Declaration].
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China and its enterprises need to develop adequate, effective
legal strategies to defend and challenge where appropriate. 2 '
In this context, efforts made by both business and government
are equally important, and both should work in tandem to ac-
complish their common goals.
A. Strategies for the Chinese Enterprises Concerned to Diminish
or Avoid Anti-Dumping Liability
As direct victims of the EU anti-dumping campaign, targeted
Chinese exporters/producers tangibly suffer the consequences
of each EU investigation. So, it must be in their best interests
to conduct a strong and effective defense against the dumping
claims, to diminish or avoid liability. For this purpose, the
Chinese enterprises concerned may want to consider the follow-
ing strategies.
1. The Prompt and Effective Response to the EU Anti-Dumping
Actions
When receiving an EU anti-dumping allegation, the Chinese
enterprises involved should take a positive or even aggressive
attitude, promptly and effectively responding to these actions.
Many lessons learned through the experiences of Chinese in-
dustries repeatedly shows the correctness of this strategy.
1 22
In the past twelve years, most of the Chinese enterprises in-
volved in the EU anti-dumping practice have taken a passive
attitude on their own role. They either ignored or just re-
mained silent concerning the anti-dumping initiations target-
ing them, considering the costly defense procedures, protection
of operational secrets of the enterprises, or even a traditional
idea that said "[s]helf it when it is none of my business." 23 But
it truly is their business.
The consequences of inaction have been tragic. With the lack
of answers from the accused Chinese companies, in most cases,
the EU directly imposed severe anti-dumping measures on
Chinese products merely based on the available facts provided
121. See id.
122. See Xiao Yu, China's TV Industry Answers EU Anti-Dumping Suit,
CHiNA EcoN. WEEKLY (Aug. 25, 2000), at http'J/www.ultrachina.com.
123. Id.
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by the European companies. Gradually, many Chinese indus-
tries concerned were kicked out of the European market.'24
For instance, until 1999, during ten years of EU investiga-
tions and reviews into SCTVs and the Chinese television
dumping matters, all accused Chinese enterprises in the televi-
sion sector retreated into obscurity, no one standing up to an-
swer the claims. During the television anti-dumping proceed-
ing in 1998, in one of a series of consequences, the Council
boldly raised the Chinese anti-dumping tax rate to 44%, and in
effect excluded Chinese enterprises from the European mar-
ket.126 In sharp contrast, Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. and LG
TeleCom of South Korea formed a strategic alliance during the
case review, provided complete data for responding, lobbied
through different channels, and defeated the claims they faced..
With a 15.1% anti-dumping tax rate, South Korean firms easily
occupied the market share previously enjoyed by the Chinese.' 21
This example should persuade Chinese enterprises to take a
positive (or even aggressive) attitude toward the role they play
in EU anti-dumping investigations. Answering such allega-
tions may be costly, but it will definitely cost more if they de-
fault in the case and do nothing. Every targeted Chinese ex-
porter/producer should take the EU proceedings for what they
are: efforts by EU producers to make foreign producers less
competitive or shut them out of the European market alto-
gether.' 28  A prompt and effective response to those actions
would always be a good start for the Chinese export-
ers/producers to win the cases and discourage their European
counterparts from further abuse of the anti-dumping instru-
ment.
2. A Strong and Sound Defense
Of course, a good start does not mean ultimate success. Chi-
nese enterprises should further conduct a strong and sound
124. See Boob Tube, supra note 66.
125. Yu, supra note 122.
126. See Council Regulation 2584/98, supra note 77, art. 1.
127. See Yu, supra note 122.
128. See Edward A. Vermulst & Folkert Graafsma, A Decade of European
Community Anti-Dumping Law and Practice Application to Imports from
China, 26 J. WORLD TRADE 5, 42 (1992).
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defense in line with the current EU anti-dumping instrument.
After all, any EU anti-dumping proceeding would be subject to
the jurisdiction of the Member State where the applicable law
is the EU anti-dumping law.
For this defensive purpose, Chinese companies concerned
need to take full advantage of the current EU anti-dumping
instrument for their own interest. First of all, they should de-
velop a complete, accurate working knowledge of the EU rules,
in the sense of both substance and procedure. Then, with the
knowledge acquired, they may strategically apply the EU anti-
dumping rules in favor of Chinese interests to build up an ef-
fective, strong defense. Below are presented several aspects of
how to carry out this strategy.
Due to the nature of anti-dumping proceedings, accused Chi-
nese enterprises should pay attention to the calculation of
dumping margin (by which the existence of dumping and the
anti-dumping rate are determined), 9 and try to minimize this
margin in their respective cases. A calculation in favor of the
Chinese companies can be conducted through a number of
steps. First, the Chinese enterprises should seek full ME
status by convincing the EU they fulfill the five criteria pro-
vided in the New Anti-dumping Rule. 3 ' Succeeding in doing so,
the Chinese enterprises will be entitled to a normal methodol-
ogy in the determination of dumping margin, which may mini-
mize the margin the most.
When failing to obtain full ME status, Chinese enterprises
may shift their efforts to pursuing a traditional individual
treatment which is occasionally available to the accused com-
panies under the EU regime.31 Individual treatment can con-
tribute to minimizing the dumping margin of targeted Chinese
enterprises, for their individual domestic export price will be
taken into account, and their own comparative advantages in
the European market (low labor cost, low material cost) will
possibly be accepted for purpose of adjusting the margin as
well.'
32
129. See Council Regulation 384/96, supra note 11, art. 2(11)-(12).
130. See Council Regulation 905/98, supra note 38, art. 1.
131. See Fu, supra note 5, at 81.
132. See Wang, supra note 14, at 145.
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However, the individual treatment does not exclude the ap-
plication of an undesirable analogue country methodology in
the determination of normal value.'33 The accused Chinese en-
terprises may still risk a high dumping margin. In light of
this, how to choose an appropriate analogue country will still
be a big concern.
As for those who neither obtain full ME status nor receive
individual treatment, they may risk the highest dumping mar-
gin, since the EU can be expected to apply the most unfair and
discriminatory anti-dumping policy to their cases, as it has
done in the past to most of the accused Chinese companies."'
For these unfortunate enterprises, the only strategy available,
in respect to dumping margin calculations, is to make certain
that an appropriate analogue country is selected for determin-
ing normal value. It should be noted that calculation of dump-
ing margin is merely one of the technical aspects of an anti-
dumping proceeding. Though a vital part, it can never replace
the functioning of the entire proceeding. So, if a Chinese en-
terprise fails to get credits in this part, it does not mean all is
lost.
According to current EU law, anti-dumping measures shall
not be imposed until the dumping causes material injury to EU
products, such that the latter cannot compete on an equal foot-
ing with the foreign importers.' This provides the accused a
solid legal ground upon which there have been quiet a few Chi-
nese companies released from the specter of adverse findings to
avoid the anti-dumping liability.
13 6
During a twelve-year EU anti-dumping campaign against
imports from China, there were quite a few accused Chinese
exporters/producers released from liability for such reasons. In
1992, eight cases were initiated against Chinese products.137
Four of them, namely unwrought manganese, refined antimony
trioxide, gum-rosin and paint brushes were terminated due to a
133. See Fu, supra note 5, at 81-82. In the case of SCTVs, "The individual
dumping margin was, in this case, determined as a comparison between the
weighted-average normal value established in an analogue country and the
individual export price charged by each Sino-Foreign joint-venture." Id.
134. Id.
135. See Council Regulation 384/96, supra note 11, art. 3.
136. See Fu, supra note 5, at 104.
137. Id.
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lack of injury findings or because of lack of support by a major-
ity of Member States.
138
However, chances to avoid anti-dumping liability through the
injury analysis are generally slim. First, the injury analysis
involves the examination of all relevant factors, such as: (1)
increase of dumped import volumes; (2) sale price of the EU
industries undercut; (3) decrease of production volumes of the
EU industries; (4) market share loss; and (5) forced cutbacks of
employees."9 Second, the Basic Regulation apparently favors
the European complainants in this regard, by providing that
dumped imports do not have to be the only cause of the injury
to justify imposition of anti-dumping measures.' Accordingly,
burden of proof based on this analysis can often be overwhelm-
ing and prevent the accused from making a successful innocent
argument.
According to Article 9(1) of the Basic Regulation, 'Where the
complaint is withdrawn, the proceeding may be terminated
unless such termination would not be in the Community inter-
est." This provision gives another legal ground for waiving
the possible liability of the accused Chinese enterprises. A
strategy designed on this ground should focus on how to per-
suade or push the European complainants to withdraw their
complaints.' An answer may lie in the advancing China-EU
economic relations.
With economic ties growing rapidly, more and more Euro-
pean industries seek access to the broad and potentially lucra-
tive Chinese market by exporting to China or establishing
joint-venture companies with local Chinese enterprises. The
more successful their businesses are in China, the more inter-
ests they will have linked to local Chinese industries. Interest-
ingly, many European adventurers happen to be the major
complainants in the EU anti-dumping proceedings against
their present or potential Chinese partners."' A feasible ap-
138. Id.
139. Eighteenth Annual Report, supra note 7, at 13.
140. Id. See also Council Regulation 384/96, supra note 11, art. 3(5)-(7).
141. Council Regulation 384196, supra note 11, art. 9(1).
142. See Ma, supra note 3.
143. See, e.g., Hooked on A Feeling: Philips to Examine EU's Anti-Dumping
Policy on Chinese Color TVs, CHINA ONLINE (Sept. 6, 2000), at
http'//www.chinaonline.com [hereinafter Hooked on a Feeling].
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proach for the accused Chinese companies is to take advantage
of their European counterparts' consideration of the balance of
interests, and push the latter to withdraw their complaints.
Here, the Netherlands' Philips Electronics Co. ("Philips") is a
typical example. It has been seventeen years since Philips es-
tablished its first joint venture in China, in 1985.' M Today, the
European electronic giant owns more than thirty solely funded
enterprises and joint ventures with investments topping USD
$1 billion in China. 4' It has taken a considerable share of the
Chinese electronic home appliance and mobile phone markets
with the slogan "Let's make it better."'46 Meanwhile, however,
Philips has been a major complainant in a series of anti-
dumping cases against Chinese electronic products in the past
nine years.'4 7
In August 2000, when Philips sought a partnership with
China's Changhong Electronic Co. ("Changhong"), its attempts
were hurt by revelations of its role in an EU anti-dumping
campaign against Chinese manufacturers of color televisions,
including Changhong. After Philips' role was disclosed in April
2000, its efforts to obtain a partnership with the Chinese com-
pany "disgusted" Chinese consumers - especially because Phil-
ips had been prospering in the Chinese market itself.1 48 Not
only did the Chinese television industry strongly resist further
business cooperation, but it was also reported that the Chinese
public severely criticized Philips' "immoral" behavior.
Currently, some experts in the legal community suggest that
Chinese television makers take advantage of Philips' desire to
restore and improve its commercial image destroyed by this
incident, and persuade the company to withdraw its com-
plaints."' These experts regard the approach as the most prac-
tical for the accused Chinese manufacturers to settle the cases
without loss, as it is estimated there would be only a 10%
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Yu, supra note 122.
147. See Hooked on a Feeling, supra note 143.
148. EU Lawsuit Making Philips' China Color TV Partnership Difficult,
CHINA ONLINE (Aug. 14, 2000), at http://www.chinaonline.com.
149. Id.
150. Yu, supra note 122.
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chance that the enterprises would win the cases once both sides
go before the Commission.'51
As for Philips, it has been previously unwilling to negotiate.
However, between May and June 2000, it actively conducted
long negotiations with Chinese parties.152 A Philips top execu-
tive told the Chinese public that his company was already
aware of the problem, and would be taking measures to solve it
as soon as possible.'
3. The Capacity to Handle Anti-Dumping Proceedings
Above, the author has listed a few legal undertakings to en-
able Chinese enterprises to win EU anti-dumping cases. Ac-
complishment of these legal goals depends on the good per-
formance of trade lawyers hired by the investigated companies.
However, by no means can the accused companies disregard
their own substantive role in the cases:5 4 Without showing a
good capacity for handling these issues, the accused will still
encounter many difficulties with their cases.
Take the instance of an ME status claim. In the EU proceed-
ings against imports from China, when the accused Chinese
company claims ME status, it is required to meet the burden of
proof for the five criteria discussed previously.'55 To prove the
fulfillment of these criteria, the company has to provide a great
deal of information, from private managing and operating deci-
sions, accounting records, production costs and financial situa-
tions to exchange rates and the public legal environment of its
home country. Gathering and selecting this information re-
quires tremendous daily work conducted by the company itself,
in advance. Also, each submitted document requires a transla-
tion into English. This job alone can be very time consuming.
In a word, one cannot expect all these preparations to be done
overnight.
56
151. Ma, supra note 3.
152. Yu, supra note 122.
153. See Hooked on a Feeling, supra note 143.
154. See Joint Declaration, supra note 120.
155. See Council Regulation 905/98, supra note 38, art. 1.
156. See Overview of the Monitoring of Third Country Safeguard Cases and
of the Implementation of the Trade Barriers Regulation: Seventeenth Annual
Report from the Commission to the European Parliament on the Commu-
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In addition, according to the Basic Regulation, deadlines for
an anti-dumping investigation remain fixed, so that an ME
status claim has to be dealt with extremely quickly in order to
meet these deadlines.'57 A special claim form should be com-
pleted and returned to the Commission within three weeks of
the initiation of a proceeding. In this form, a minimum amount
of information is required, which is needed to decide whether or
not a concerned Chinese company is operating in a market
economy environment (five criteria).158 Due to the tight dead-
lines, both the criteria and the timeframes are applied strictly.
If any information is missing in the completed claim form, or if
it is returned late, the claim is automatically rejected. 5 9
For these reasons, accused Chinese companies should
strengthen their capacity to perform the comprehensive work
required by the EU proceedings. The key issue here is to cre-
ate a corporate structure ready for any possible anti-dumping
challenge. In this context, a company may want to establish
the following structures: (1) "sales personnel, to enforce price
guidelines and review sales and selling expense information;"
(2) "accounting personnel, to collect and derive the necessary
cost, expense and sales information from the corporate, divi-
sional and factory levels;" (3) "computer personnel, to arrange
and maintain necessary data, and to run the dumping margin
analysis;" and (4) "adoption of the EU competition law."60
Like an old Chinese saying says: "Attack is the best defense."
Thus the accused Chinese companies may also try another ap-
proach to make the anti-dumping initiations void - to invoke
the EU competition law due to an inherent controversy be-
tween the anti-dumping law and competition law.'6 '
This strategy seems very tricky, but is truly feasible! An in-
teresting case may convince Chinese companies of this. In the
nity's Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidies Activities, COM(99)411 final at 7-8
[hereinafter Seventeenth Annual Report].
157. See id. at 7.
158. See id.
159. See id. at 8.
160. Corr, supra note 102, at 106.
161. See Peter J. Koenig, Hot Topics in Dumping Law and Steel, Paper
Presented to Metal Bulletin's Eastern European Steel Conference (May 27-
29, 1998), at http://ablondifoster.com/library/article.asp?pubid=94359792001
&groupid=12.
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late 1990's, European stainless steel bar producers filed a
dumping complaint against Indian counterparts, putting the
latter under dumping investigation.'62 Soon after, Indian pro-
ducers filed a complaint as well, asserting that the European
bar producers had unlawfully fixed prices. As a result, the EU
launched a price fixing investigation. Such a situation raised
an important question as to the EU's anti-dumping practice:
Whether imports should be found dumped and injurious on the
basis of depressing EU prices when those prices -had been
unlawfully fixed?"6 Obviously the answer should be "no."
4. Adoption of the Chinese Anti-Dumping Instrument
Anti-dumping is a traditional and commonly used weapon in
worldwide trade wars. Industries of many nations often adopt
their own domestic anti-dumping instruments to restrain the
anti-dumping campaigns launched by foreign competitors.'6'
However, to many Chinese companies that have suffered se-
verely at the hands of foreign investigations, this weapon is too
new to be handled freely.
Not until 1997 did China formulate her first anti-dumping
legislation, the Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidies Regulations
of the People's Republic of China ("Anti-Dumping and Anti-
Subsidies Regulations")."6  Since then, there have been few
Chinese industries adopting this domestic instrument to com-
bat the anti-dumping campaigns from foreign economies, in-
cluding the EU.1
66
Under the current situation, where an increasing number of
leading European industries are seeking access to broad and
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Doreen Bekker, China and Antidumping Legislation, Paper Presented
at the Economic Society of South Africa's Conference (Sept. 6-7, 1999) (on file
with Journal).
165. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Fanqingxiao He Funbutie Tiaoli (Anti-
Dumping and Anti-Subsidy Regulations of the People's Republic of China),
ch. I, translated in China L. for Foreign Bus. Reg. (CCH) 19-620-19-
620(42) (Aug. 26, 1997).
166. See Kermit Almstedt & Patrick M. Norton, China's Antidumping Laws
and the WTO Antidumping Agreement, 34 J. WoRLD TRADE 75, 75-76 n.4-5
(2000). By 2000, among the five anti-dumping investigations undertaken by
China on imports of newsprint, steel and chemical products, three received
final rulings and one received a preliminary ruling. Id.
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potentially lucrative Chinese markets, their business interests
become increasingly linked to China. Any Chinese domestic
anti-dumping initiation targeting European adventurers may
constitute a heavy form of pressure on the latter."7 So, there is
no reason why suffering Chinese companies cannot take full
advantage of new domestic instruments to restrain their Euro-
pean counterparts from abusing the rights under EU anti-
dumping law. Of course, this strategy needs strong support
from the Chinese government. Below, the author discusses in
more detail the role of Beijing in fighting the EU campaign.
B. Strategies for the Chinese Government to Challenge EU Anti-
Dumping Law and Practice
The Chinese government plays an independent and vital role
in its discretion to challenge the EU anti-dumping campaign
against imports from China. China's objective is to support,
assist and guide domestic industries concerned with winning
this legal contest. Generally, the Ministry of Foreign Trade
and Economic Cooperation ("MOFTEC") is the main govern-
mental organ in charge in this field.'68 In recent years, other
quasi-governmental organizations have also played an active
role on this front, such as the Import and Export Chamber and
the Foreign Investment Society. They make it the emphasis of
their work to systematically organize Chinese enterprises con-
cerned with such an onslaught.9 Currently, there are several
strategies available to China in accomplishing its objective re-
garding the anti-dumping fight.
1. Imposing Political Pressures
The inflexibility of the EU anti-dumping legislation is a long-
standing problem that contributes to the continuous trend of
campaigns against China. Development of new law within the
EU advances very slowly due to internal bureaucratic opera-
167. See Hooked on Feeling, supra note 143.
168. For more information on MOFTEC, visit its official website at
http://www.moftec.gov.cn/moftec-en/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2002).
169. See Yu, supra note 122.
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tions.' 0 Such legislative lethargy pays no heed to the fascinat-
ing changes happening in today's China.-
Expecting a fundamental change in this field, China should
urge the EU to adjust its anti-dumping instrument in light of
the changing reality of China's economy, by amending the cur-
rent regulations in a timely and efficient manner. External po-
litical pressure can be a good shortcut to that end. The New
Anti-dumping Rule is a successful example where, under the
political pressure from China, the EU was forced to update its
rules on regulation of imports from NME countries, including
China.1 ' In sum, by gaining as many bids as possible from the
rapid growth of China-EU trade relations, and the increasing
interests attached to the Chinese market by European compa-
nies, Beijing may take a firm stance to impose more political
pressure on the EU in bilateral negotiations. This can help
push EU law and practice in a new direction that will diminish
their discriminatory and unfair impacts on China.
2. Implementing Pragmatic Trade Policies
For many years, Western countries consistently criticized
China for her "trade protectionism" practice.' 2 However, facing
a severe anti-dumping campaign from the EU, China may have
to strengthen the implementation of its protective trade policy,
launching appropriate trade retaliations to challenge this cam-
paigu. In particular, under the current situation where the EU
rarely adjusts its anti-dumping instrument in favor of China,
while European industries frequently adopt this instrument to
strike at their Chinese competitors, the strategy of taking
pragmatic trade retaliation is likely to appear reasonable and
workable to the Chinese government.'
7 3
170. See Sean C. Monoghan, Comment, European Union Legal Personality
Disorder: The Union's Legal Nature Through the Prism of the German Fed-
eral Constitutional Court's Maastricht Decision, 12 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 1443,
1474-75 (1998).
171. See Eighteenth Annual Report, supra note 7, at 16-17.
172. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2001 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT
ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERs 42 (2001), available at http'J/www.ustr.gov/
htmII2001_contents.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2002).
173. See Eighteenth Annual Report, supra note 7, at 16-17; Seventeenth
Annual Report, supra note 156, at 6-7.
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The recent case of the China-Korea "garlic war" may have al-
ready convinced Beijing of the benefits of this strategy."4 From
1998 to 1999, with a dramatic increase in China's exports of
garlic to the Korean market from 3.4% to a whopping 35%, the
Korean government simply increased the import tariff from
35% to an astronomical 315%.175 Correspondingly, China re-
taliated and banned Korean imports of polyethylene and cellu-
lar phones - two of Korea's major export items. This garlic
trade war ended in a compromise after two weeks of intense
negotiations between the two countries, with Korea agreeing to
set certain "quotable tariff' levies upon imported Chinese gar-
ic.17
6
We may wonder if there is any significant difference between
the EU and Korea regarding their importance in China's for-
eign trading. The big difference is that China's trade retalia-
tion against the EU can invite a more severe revenge from the
EU, and ultimately lead to more serious damage to the Chinese
industries in the European market. 177 We must remember,
however, that the health of China-EU trade relations can only
be guaranteed on a reciprocal basis; a primary threshold for
both sides to mutually benefit in their trade relations. It must
be in the fundamental interests of China, and ultimately, the
cause of free trade, for Beijing to adopt a trade policy instru-
ment to challenge the unfair, discriminatory anti-dumping
campaigns from abroad, including EU. Trade retaliations may
be a worthwhile strategy for the Chinese under the present
circumstances.
3. Improving the Chinese Regime
As we may realize, with a reciprocal approach, other than a
legitimate one that is recognized by the international trading
forum (the WTO), trade retaliations are just a tentative tech-
nique to cope with the EU anti-dumping campaign.' 8 A better
174. Caroline Cooper, End of Garlic War Brings Korea Potpourri of Good
News, CHINA ONLINE (Aug. 14, 2000), at http://www.chinaonline.com.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Ma, supra note 3.
178. It was not until May 1994, when the government promulgated the
Foreign Trade Law of the People's Republic of China, that the country ap-
plied the reciprocity principle of the GATT to resolutions of Chinese trade
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strategy may be for China to make efforts to improve its do-
mestic regime, which is currently supported by a single statute,
the Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidies Regulations. That law is
just a copy of those that exist in certain Western countries, fail-
ing to reflect the reality of China's anti-dumping situation. As
a source of law, the regulations are too abstract and general to
be effective.
To improve the domestic regime, Beijing has been working on
formulating a new law to address the abuse of anti-dumping by
foreign enterprises, so as to impose sanctions in China's domes-
tic market against those who, using unequal methods, hinder
Chinese exports abroad.79 Hopefully this law will successfully
codify the balanced approach advocated here.
4. Taking Advantage of the Recent WTO Membership
All three strategies mentioned above are either at the unilat-
eral or bilateral level. Today, as China has recently entered
the WTO, 80 the government may think about taking advantage
of its membership to resolve the problem of the ongoing EU
investigations.
in fact, the EU already takes into account China's WTO
membership within its legislation. The Proposal for a Council
Regulation Amending Regulation 384/946 suggested that "[oln
the basis that membership of the WTO indicates a certain level
of economic reform and trade liberalization, it is proposed to
extend the [ME] regime to those NME countries who are mem-
disputes with other countries. See ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO DUiWAI
MAOYI FA (Foreign Trade Law of the People's Republic of China) art. 7, trans-
lated in LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS COMMN OF THE STANDING COMM. OF THE NAT'L
PEOPLE'S CONGRESS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, THE LAWS OF THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1994, at 29-37 (1996). According to Article 7, the
government should undertake appropriate counter measures against any
countries or territories that apply discriminatory trade bans or trade restric-
tions against China. Id.
179. Recently, the new Anti-Dumping Regulation of the People's Republic
of China entered into force on January 1, 2002. See Zhonghua Renmin
Gongheguo Fanqingxiao Tiaoli (Anti-Dumping Rules of the People's Republic
of China), available at http'/www.cacs.gov.cb/new/wto/wtoOl.htm (last vis-
ited Mar. 7, 2002).
180. See Press Release, supra note 98.
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bers of the WTO, and to automatically extend it to others when
they become WTO members in the future." 8'
To apply the Basic Regulation to China's entry into the WTO,
the Commission further suggested an amendment:
In antidumping investigations concerning . . .the People's
Republic of China ... which is a member of the WTO at the
date of the initiation of the investigation, normal value will be
determined in accordance with paragraphs 1 to 6, if it shown,
on the basis of properly substantiated claims by one or more
producers ... and in accordance with the criteria and proce-
dures set out in subparagraph (c) that market economy condi-
tions prevail for this producer or producers in respect of the
manufacture and sale of the like product concerned. When
this is not the case, the rules set out under subparagraph (a)
shall apply.
82
However, we may notice that this prospective amendment
does not lead to any substantial change in current EU anti-
dumping legislation concerning China. The case-by-case ap-
proach will remain the same as before, regardless of China's
membership in the VTO, which will not necessarily mean
China's coveted classification as an ME country. Therefore, it
is predictable that WTO membership will not be very helpful
for the accused Chinese enterprises aiming to gain full ME
status in the EU proceedings.
For this reason, China should pay most of its attentions to
another main aspect of the WTO - its dispute settlement
mechanism. '83 With China's entry into the WTO, it is now able
to invoke the Dispute Settlement Mechanism of the WTO to
challenge EU anti-dumping legislation and practice not in her
favor - just as the EU has long been doing against its trading
partners.' In this way, China will be entitled to resolve the
181. Commission Proposal, supra note 64, at 15.
182. Id. at 21.
183. See DSU, supra note 99, art. 1.
184. On August 28, 2000, the WTO Appellate Body upheld a Dispute Set-
tlement Panel ruling against the United States Anti-dumping Act of 1916.
As one of the parties to the case, the EU had been playing a very active role
in challenging this legislation. See WTO Appellate Body Report on United
States Anti-Dumping Act of 1916, WT/DS136/AB/R, WTIDS162/AB/R (Aug.
28, 2000), at http://www.wto.org.
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problem of the anti-dumping campaign at a more advanced
multilateral level.
It is notable that, whatever strategy China may use, it
should embrace a strong awareness of serving domestic enter-
prise and industry, working closely with them to guide, support
and assist their move to challenge the EU anti-dumping cam-
paign.
VI. CONCLUSION
Today, as China is increasingly integrating into the global
economy and opens its doors to the world, China-EU trade rela-
tions may become strengthened and extended to a new level.
When increasing numbers of Chinese enterprises begin seeking
access to the European market, the ongoing EU anti-dumping
campaign can constitute a huge obstacle. Frustrated by this
campaign, not only will the international market exploration
by Chinese industries become empty talk, but the health of
China-EU trade relations will also be severely undermined.
This consequence is good for neither China nor the EU. In par-
ticular, excessive anti-China trade restrictions by the EU tends
to worsen the domestic dislocations and resultant human suf-
fering in China, the country with the world's largest popula-
tion.
The reality is that China has become one of the most signifi-
cant targets, and also one of the most distinctive victims, of the
EU anti-dumping campaign. This situation is manifest in a
continuous trend, and will not be repaired in the short run.
Facing such a truth, China and its industries should work
closely to develop adequate and effective legal strategies to
challenge this campaign. A positive attitude is important,
while the right approaches are necessary. At this moment, the
road ahead remains long and winding.
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